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Abstract 
This article analyses the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to 
respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the 
differences in current financing practices be explained by country specific factors? We 
perform an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of 
banks´ prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and 
financial authorities). We conclude that supervisors in central banks are more likely publicly 
funded, while financial authorities are more likely funded via a levy on the regulated banks. 
The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is 
more likely in bank oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: 
European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. In general, 
we do not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of 
development and the legal tradition. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, many countries have witnessed changes in the architecture of 
banking supervision.1 Often the institutional change was triggered by a banking crisis, which 
harmed the reputation of the supervisor.2 But also, policymakers were pressed to rethink the 
supervisory structures by changes in the structure of the financial industry brought about 
by mergers between banks, insurance companies and securities firms (conglomeration), 
internationalisation of the financial activity and the blurring of distinctions between various 
types of financial products.3 
Nonetheless, in a number of countries, there is still an ongoing debate about 
whether the supervisory structure should be reformed, and if so, in what direction.4 Recent 
literature argues that the responsibility for prudential supervision should be delegated to 
a specific independent agency, provided that this agency has defined clear objectives and 
political independence, it has the adequate supervisory instruments to achieve these 
objectives, and it is held accountable to ensure checks and balances.5 
Supervisory independence has four dimensions: 1) regulatory independence, 
associated with a wide autonomy in setting prudential rules and regulations; 2) supervisory 
independence from political interference and industry intimidation; 3) institutional autonomy 
associated with the security of tenure of supervisors; and 4) budgetary (financial) 
independence.6 
Three questions are particularly relevant in the analysis of budgetary independence. 
Is there any optimal financing model of supervision? Which are the most common financing 
practices? Can we explain differences in current financing practices by country specific 
factors? 
The objective of this article is to respond to the second and third questions. To this 
end, we present the supervisors´ financing rules in a large number of countries and we 
attempt to identify the determinant factors, and explain the differences between countries. 
Given that the budget procedure has an important role in the overall banking supervision 
architecture, we wish to have a better understanding of the motives behind the choice of the 
financing practices. We will qualify the results cum anecdotal evidence on the budgetary 
practices. 
                                                                          
1. A review of the trend in supervisory architectures is performed in Masciandaro (2004). 
2. The link between banking instability, supervisor’s reputation failure and reform of the supervision architecture in the 
case of Estonia, Latvia, Korea and United Kingdom is described in Masciandaro ( 2005). 
3. The role of the financial blurring effect in explaining the reform of the supervisory architecture is highlighted 
in Grunbichler (2005) for Austria, Schuler (2005) for Germany, Prast (2005) for The Netherlands. Masciandaro 
(2005 and 2006) and Masciandaro and Quintyn (2007) performed empirical analyses on the determinants of 
supervisory reforms, checking the robustness of  the financial blurring effect. 
4. In December 2005, the Italian Parliament confirmed the actual “hybrid” supervisory institutional setting, shortening the 
Governor´s time in office and implementing a reform of the antitrust responsibilities, which reduced the central bank 
involvement. 
5. Quintyn and Taylor (2002, 2003 and 2004), Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004) and Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor (2005). 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognized the importance of these principles in the “Core Principles for 
Effective Bank Supervision”. See BIS (1997). 
6. Quintyn and Taylor (2004). See also Bini Smaghi (2006) and Quintyn (2006). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0725 
Budgetary independence and accountability are the two pillars of financial 
governance. For the purpose of this paper, financial governance is the set of rules that defines 
how prudential supervision is financed, and the accountability arrangements related to the 
financial accounts as well as the supervisors activity. The recent economic literature on 
governance of supervision has paid little attention to the issue of financial governance.7 
To the best of our knowledge, there is a dearth of studies on this question. We will focus on 
the budgetary rules in this article. 
Furthermore, we will focus on the study of prudential supervision of banks, although 
we realise that changes in the structure of the financial industry would also require the 
analysis of insurance and securities supervision. In fact, many countries have integrated 
financial supervision of the three sectors, including in some instances the supervision of 
pension funds. Being limited to banks´ prudential supervision, this article should therefore be 
regarded as a first contribution to the more comprehensive analysis of the budgetary 
governance of financial sector supervision. Moreover, by limiting ourselves to prudential 
supervision, we overlook conduct-of-business supervision, which, in some countries, is 
carried out by the same institution as the one responsible for prudential supervision. 
In addition to the introduction, this article is divided in four parts. The second part 
proposes a simple framework to discuss the economics of financing banking supervision. 
Part three describes the overall supervisory architecture in a number of countries, paying 
particular attention to the financing rules. Our data consists on information about the financing 
of 90 banking supervisors (central banks, specialised supervisory agencies, single financial 
authorities). Part four presents the empirical analysis that identifies the determinant factors of 
the financing structure of banks´ prudential supervision. The conclusions are presented in part 
five. 
                                                                          
7. Lastra and Shams (2001) present an analytical framework for understanding the notion of accountability in the 
financial sector. Lybek and Morris (2004) and Frisell, Roszbach and Spagnolo (2004) study the specific corporate 
governance issues of central banks. Arnone, Darbar and Gambini (2005) analyze the issue of public governance in 
banking supervision. Masciandaro, Nieto and Prast (2007) performed an empirical analysis, using data collected through 
a questionnaire sent out in 2005 to a large number of banking supervisors. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0725 
2 Economics of Financing Supervision 
We claim that the principal-agent theory as proposed by Alesina and Tabellini 
(2004 and 2005) is the appropriate general analytical framework to analyse the financing 
of banking supervision.8 Society is the main principal with an interest in the soundness of 
individual banks and the banking system as a whole and the prudential supervisor is 
the agent of the government.9 However, this analytical framework does not discuss who 
should pay for supervision. Still, one might argue that if society is regarded as the principal 
this would automatically imply that the taxpayer should finance banking supervision. But the 
question is not so simple. 
In addition to the principal - agent approach to the explicit contract between society 
(taxpayers) and the supervisor (social contract), two implicit contracts, with associated risks of 
capture, can be identified. These are the government driven and the industry driven contracts. 
These implicit contracts may be relevant for the analysis of the financing governance of 
supervision and, more specifically, its budgetary aspects. 
An implicit contract between the government and the banking supervisor could exist 
within the framework of the grabbing hand theory.10 According to this theory, the contract 
would be designed to extract short term political rent from supervision. For example, the 
government may put pressure on the supervisor not to close a bank, as bank closure comes 
at a political cost, with depositors and possibly taxpayers being harmed.11 The supervisor’s 
explicit contract should be designed so that an implicit government-driven contract is difficult 
to establish. Independence from the politicians is recognized as good practice in the first 
Basle Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision.12 
Another implicit contract may exist between the banking industry —as a vested 
interest group— or even between individual banks and the prudential supervisor. This implicit 
contract would serve the specific interests of the regulated firm(s), for example by softer 
prudential regulatory requirements, special accounting rules, and forbearance in general. 
The classic capture theory provides the analytical framework for the implicit contract between 
supervised institutions and their supervisors.13 
Last but not least, there is the risk that the supervisors pursue its self interest, which 
may not be consistent with social welfare. This self interest may be its reputation, and it 
                                                                          
8. The delegation approach has been recently used to debate financial supervisory issues in Bjerre –Nielsen (2004). 
There are two theoretical models on banking supervision architecture –Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2004)– but 
without any explicit identification and discussion of the policymaker (lawmaker) objective function. 
9. It should be stressed, however, that there may be trade offs between macro and micro stability. Thus, there is 
the possibility of a conflict between price stability and the stability of the financial system. Another potential 
conflict is that between the objectives of macro- and micro-prudential regulation, more precisely between stability of 
the banking system as a whole on the one hand, and the health and efficiency of individual banks on the other 
[see Crockett (2001)]. 
10. Shleifer and Vishy (1998). The risks of political capture can emerge, given an institutional delegation framework 
that attributes financial supervision tasks to independent un-elected bureaucrats. The institutional design problem 
is analysed in Alesina and Tabellini (2004) from a society’ welfare maximization point of view, while Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005) investigate the politicians’ point of view, which have to decide what to delegate to bureaucrats and what 
to retain for themselves. 
11. Quintyn and Taylor (2002). 
12. See Principle 1 of the Basle Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision: BIS (1997). 
13. Stigler (1971). 
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has been argued that this may result in regulatory forbearance (self bureaucrat capture).14 
The supervisor's behaviour could be consistent with the “career concern model” as presented 
by Alesina and Tabellini (2005).15 
Obviously the interests of the government and /or the banking firms can capture 
the supervisor through the influence on its self interest, for example its career and 
financial reward. Alternatively, the banking industry capture could be an indirect case of 
political capture, or vice versa. In other words, the grabbing hand theory, the capture 
theory and the career concern theory can be deeply intertwined. Therefore there must 
be transparency and accountability procedures on the supervisor's activities.16 Accountability 
reduces the risk that supervision is manipulated.17 
Summing up, prudential supervisor independence has three dimensions: on the one 
hand freedom from political and regulated industry interference, on the other the avoidance of 
self bureaucratic interests.18 
Against this background, this article focuses on the financing of prudential 
supervision as an instrument to avoid capture problems. The question we are ultimately 
interested in is what role the financing of supervision may play in discouraging political, 
industry and self bureaucrat captures at the expense of society. 
In order to minimize the risks of distortions, the principal-agent theory suggests as 
first best solution that the budget of the supervisory agency (and the remunerations of 
its managers) should be linked to performance. However, it is difficult to find robust 
performance indicators for the performance of financial supervision.19 
Given the difficulties of the performance based approach, a second best solution 
could be to invoke a more general principle: A financial independent supervisor is one 
that possesses the necessary resources to pursue its mandate, without any veto player 
interference.20 The veto player could be a political body (political capture risk) or supervised 
institution (industry capture risk) or both. 
The effectiveness of the second best solution depends on the existence 
of procedures for financial and general accountability. Supervisors have to follow those 
procedures aimed at explaining and justifying their actions in general and, more specifically, 
                                                                          
14. Kane (1990), Boot and Thakor (1993). 
15. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) analyse the bureaucratic behaviour following the career concern model, and they 
point out that career concerns can be interpreted broadly (employment prospects in private sector, legacy, fame, 
recognition, etc.). 
16. Lastra and Shams (2001) examine the interrelationship between accountability and transparency and provide a 
definition of the latter. 
17. Quintyn and Taylor (2002). 
18. Quintyn and Taylor (2002). 
19. The Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions  (OSFI) proposes a general framework that links 
its two strategic goals (to contribute to public confidence and to safeguard from undue loss) with different performance 
measurements (number of involuntary closures of financial institutions initiated by OSFI, OSFI’s treatment of companies 
in difficulty, etc.) for accountability purposes [see OSFI (2005)]. In England the Financial Services Authority (FSA) presents 
a Business Plan, that explains its priorities and commits to allocate and use resources in an efficient way, setting the 
budgetary levels of expenditure and the relative plan for funding [see FSA (2004 and  2005)]. 
20. This is easiest if supervisory costs are paid out of seigniorage, in a contract where the profits of the central bank, 
after deduction of expenses, go to the treasury. In this fashion, supervisory costs are so to speak ‘hidden’ in the total 
expenses for monetary policy, the payment system, etc. Therefore it is to be expected that if supervision is taken care of 
by the central bank, it is more likely that financing will come at least partly from the taxpayer through seigniorage. If costs 
are not hidden, the budget may need approval. Finally, it could be that certain expenditures, at a discretionary basis, 
may be vetoed. 
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the use of their financial resources wherever they come from. In some instances, there might 
be a link between the supervisors’ policy and its funding because of the capacity of the 
supervisor to impose penalties and fees on the supervised institutions. This requires special 
accountability provisions. Furthermore, given a particular budget constraint, the accountability 
provisions should ensure that the supervisor manages its resources in a cost-effective way. 
In conclusion, so far an optimal model of financing prudential supervision does not 
exist in the literature21. But this assessment does not imply automatically that the features of 
the financial governance of supervision are random variables. We can test an alternative 
hypothesis: Are there any common determinants in the decision each country makes to 
maintain or reform its budgetary regimes in banking supervision? For these reasons, it is 
relevant to shed light on the general features and their determinants —if any— of the bank 
supervisors´ financing setting around the world. 
 
                                                                          
21. In general an optimal model of supervision does not exist. The theoretical literature puts forward several arguments 
for and against the different supervision models, suggesting that the overall topic should be investigated using empirical 
tools. Arnone and Gambino (2006) and Cihàk and Podpiera (2006) carried out cross country analysis on the relationship 
between the type of the supervision regime and the quality of supervision itself. 
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3 Banking Supervisory Architectures and Financial Governance Models 
The question of who pays for supervision is related to the question of who is the supervisor. 
This section first identifies the relevant banking authority and, secondly, it shows empirical 
data on the financing sources —public, private or mixed— of supervision.22 
The reform of the financial supervisory architectures has taken place in the context of 
growing vertical, horizontal and international integration of the banking, securities and 
insurance industries (financial blurring effect). Until recently, in fact, it was easy to distinguish 
the three financial sectors in nearly every country, and the organization of supervision 
of financial intermediaries followed accordingly a “sectoral” model. The desegmentation of 
markets, instruments and providers of financial services (conglomeration) threw the “sectoral” 
model into crisis, revealing its risks in terms of effectiveness, due to the possibility of 
regulatory arbitrage, and efficiency, due to the costs of controls for the regulated entities and 
diseconomies for the regulators. 
As a result of these phenomena, a wave of reforms of the financial supervision 
architectures has taken place since the second half of the 1990´s. Over the past decade, a 
change in the institutional model for supervision has been observed, from the traditional 
model based upon the sectoral activity (banking, insurance or securities) such as in the case 
of Greece, Portugal and Spain, towards two types of models: one goal based model or “twin 
peaks”, adopted in Netherlands, where the organization of the regime is driven by what the 
organization is trying to achieve —e. g. stability on the one side and investor protection on 
the other side— independently of the type of activity of the financial firm;23 or a single financial 
authority (SFA) model, in which the supervision of the three sectors is passed to a single 
authority responsible for complying with the aforementioned objectives (e. g. among others 
Austria, Germany, Japan, Sweden and UK). The distinct models of organization for the 
supervision of financial intermediaries have advantages and disadvantages, which have been 
recently examined in the academic literature.24 
At present, the banking supervision design around the world seems to be 
characterized by polarization (Table 1). In the majority of countries (48 countries) of our 
sample (90 countries), the central bank is the unique supervisor (e.g. Spain, Greece 
and Portugal), while the main supervisor is the single financial authority in fewer countries 
(16 countries) (e. g. Japan, UK, Austria). 
Furthermore, in some countries there is a specialized banking supervisor different 
from the central bank (7 countries) (e. g. Turkey). A small group of countries adopted a 
banking and insurance supervisor (6 countries) (e. g. Canada), while others a banking and 
securities authority (4 countries) (e. g. Luxemburg). Finally, only in a few countries 
(10 countries) the banking sector is supervised by more than one authority (e. g. France). 
 For the purpose of this paper, we have identified the principal banking supervisory 
authority (CB, single authority and specialized banking authorities —(S)FAs—) in the above 
                                                                          
22. The BIS Governance network provided valuable information in this regard. 
23. Taylor (1995). The Netherlands seems the most refined version of this model. 
24. Taylor (1995); Abrams and Taylor (2000); Di Giorgo, di Noia and Piatti (2000), and Lannoo (2002). These references 
are usefully collected in Nieto and Peñalosa (2004). 
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mentioned sample of 90 countries, which includes the 25 countries of the European Union, 
Also, we gathered information on their financial governance rules, more specifically, on their 
financing arrangements of banking supervision. 
The source of financing of banking supervision may come directly (budget assigned 
by government) or indirectly (seigniorage) from taxpayers (public funding). Also, supervised 
institutions may financially support totally (private funding) or in part (mixed funding) 
prudential supervision. Figures 1 and 2 show an overview of the financing sources of banking 
supervision in CBs and (S)FAs. Figure 1 shows that full public financing is the most common 
budgetary arrangement for central banks as banking supervisors. Figure 2 shows that (S)FAs 
and specialized banking authorities are most commonly financed by supervised entities. 
Seigniorage is the sole source of financing of bank supervisors in some countries 
where central banks are responsible for supervision, such as Spain and Portugal. Although 
seigniorage is the typical source of financing of prudential supervisors in central banks, in 
some countries such as Hong-Kong, and Slovenia, supervision is fully financed by banks 
in spite of being located in the central bank. In Hong Kong, the expenses incurred by 
supervisors are funded primarily by license fees collected from supervised institutions. License 
fees take the form of an annual fee on the license as well as on each local or overseas 
branch. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) policy is to recover fully the cost of 
supervisory activities via the collection of such fees. The HKMA absorbs, if needed, the deficit 
not covered by the license fees. The budget is approved by government. In Slovenia, banks 
pay an annual fee based on risk weighted assets. In addition, banks pay penalty fees when 
on-site examinations reveal irregularities. Penalty fees are calculated as a multiple of the 
number of hours examiners have used to examine the penalized institution and the hourly 
fee for examiners´ work according to the tariffs of the Bank of Slovenia. The Bank of Slovenia 
informs to the national Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia about its annual financial 
statements and its financial plan. 
On the contrary, supervised institutions are in general the sole source of financing of 
SFAs. In the UK, as an example, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is financed by fees 
charged to the regulated community and the budget is decided upon the FSA. Those fees are 
of three types: First, application fees which are a contribution to the cost of processing 
applications of new firms seeking authorization or variations in their permission. Secondly, 
annual fees (most important source) based on the size of supervised firms and the costs of 
regulation. Thirdly, special project fees charged for regulatory work performed primarily for the 
benefit of a single firm or small group of firms.25 The non-executive members of the FSA 
Governing Body form a committee with the responsibility of reviewing the efficiency and 
economy with which it uses its resources.26 In Sweden, the cost distribution is primarily based 
on time spent on certain categories of institutions and secondly based on the size of 
institutions. The budget is proposed by the government and decided upon by the parliament. 
In other countries, the factors that affect the cost allocation among supervised institutions are 
revenue or type of activity. In contrast with the budgetary independence of most SFAs, in 
Japan, the Financial Services Authority has no budgetary independence and it is fully funded 
from the central government budget.27 
                                                                          
25. FSA (2006). 
26. Lastra and Shams (2001). 
27. International Monetary Fund (2003). 
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Bank supervision may also be financed by both taxpayers and supervised 
institutions. This is the case in a number of countries such as Germany28, Ireland and the 
Netherlands (all CBs). In Germany, the seigniorage amounts for 94% of the financing of 
the supervisory activities of the Bundesbank. While in Ireland, it amounts to 50% of the 
financing of the Irish Financial Services Authority. In the Netherlands, a separate budget is 
established for the supervisory branch within the central bank. Of this separate budget, 35% 
is funded by the government; the remainder is funded by the private sector. 
Most CBs with prudential supervision do have budgeting processes for the 
supervisory activities which are exactly the same as those of the central bank. This is the case 
in Ireland where the Irish Financial Services Authority, in spite of being a separate body within 
the legal entity of the Central Bank of Ireland, shares the same budgeting process. 
On the contrary, The Netherlandsche Bank has a special budgetary approach applicable only 
to supervisory activities.29 
                                                                          
28. Figure 3 does not consider the Bundesbank (as well as for example the Osterreichische Nationalbank, the central 
bank of Austria), given that it represents 53 central banks which are the main supervisor in their country. In Germany the 
main supervisor is the Bafin (as the FMA in Austria). 
29. In the Netherlands, the organizational budget is split in two parts, one for the DNB as a central bank and one 
for DNB as a prudential supervisor. The budget for supervisory tasks of the DNB is drawn up by the DNB, and it is 
presented to the advisory panels of market participants. Subsequently, it is submitted for approval to the Supervisory 
Board and, eventually, submitted to the Minister of Finance. 
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4 What Drives Financial Governance? 
Which are the determinants of the choice of a given budgetary regime?  Some authors have 
reflected on whether the development of financial supervision architecture is designed or 
accidental. Goodhart (2004) defends that the design of supervision is essentially reactive, 
lagged behind innovation and evolving risks, and that the reasons for supervisory reforms 
are largely political. The economic literature, however, has paid little attention to the issue of 
financial governance and, more specifically to its budgetary aspects. In this regard, this paper 
tests the hypothesis that its evolution is not accidental, and, at the same time, attempts to 
identify the determinants of the different financing rules. 
How do we identify the determinants of supervisors´ financing rules? In order to 
assess this relationship, we estimate a probability model of different financing rules´ decisions 
as a function of structural, economic and institutional variables30. 
Financing rules can be contemplated as resulting from an unobserved variable: the 
optimal degree of public financing consistent with the policymaker's utility. Each actual 
budgetary regime corresponds to a specific range of the optimal supervisor's public financing. 
The level of supervisor's public financing is maximized in the full public funding regime, while it 
is minimised in the private funding regime. Since the public financing is a qualitative ordinal 
variable, the estimation of a model for such dependent variable requires the use of a specific 
technique. The ordered model is an appropriate estimator, given the ordered nature of the 
policymaker alternative.31 
Which economic model can be tested? Actually, to the best of our knowledge, there 
is no general theory on the optimal design of financing supervision, and then on the 
determinants of the policymaker’s decision on the financing rule. In light of the results of the 
cross-country overview presented in part three, the choice of the budgetary regime could be 
a rule —driven path dependent variable. Rule-driven path dependence exists when, other 
conditions being equal, the choice of the financing rule depends on characteristics already 
existing or determined by the rules themselves.32 
Against this background, we test the hypothesis that the policy maker's choice 
could depend on a specific existing rule: the nature of the financial authority (CB or (S)FA). 
In this framework, a given policymaker’s choice of financing rule would depend on the nature 
of the agency involved in supervision (institutional factor: Agency Nature CB). Given 
that seigniorage is the typical source of financing when the supervisor is the central bank, the 
expected sign of the relationship between the role of central bank as supervisor and 
the choice of public funding is positive. 
The choice of the budgetary regime could be also a time – dependent variable. As a 
result, there could be a relationship between the type of financing rule and the recent wave of 
financial supervision architecture reforms, which seems to be more oriented toward the 
                                                                          
30. The estimation methodology is described in Masciandaro, Nieto and Prast 2007. 
31. See Maddala (1983) and Gourieroux (2000)  for the ordered models. See also Cramer (2003). 
32. The concept of rules driven path dependence has been recently used in the corporate governance literature: see, 
among others, Bebchuk and Roe (1999), Clark and Wojcik (2003), as well as in the financial supervision studies 
[Masciandaro (2005 and 2006)]. 
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private funding regime. We use the age of the authorities as proxy of the degree of 
“modernity” of the supervisory setting. The age of the supervisory authorities is not coincident 
with their nature (age factor: Year - Agency Establishment), notwithstanding there is 
correlation between the CB nature and the authorities´ oldness (see Table 5). The expected 
sign of the relationship between the year of the establishment of the authority and the level of 
public funding is negative. 
The political and institutional environment can explain the ability of the policymakers 
to implement their choices. The control variables must capture whether the quality of 
governance of political institutions (political factor: Goodgov) matters in defining the 
policymaker’s choice of financing rule. 
On the one hand, the expected sign of the relationship between the level of 
public funding and the political factor is likely to be negative, with policymakers that wish 
to give markets a larger role preferring the private funding model. On the other hand, the 
private funding could be a source of supervisory capture by the banking industry; therefore, 
the effectiveness of government in financial supervision —the signal of good political 
governance— could be better guaranteed using a public funding model.33 Considering also 
the above mentioned non existence of a theoretical optimal financing rule, we can conclude 
that the expected sign of the relationship between the budgetary governance and the political 
factor is undetermined (i.e. it can be either positive or negative). 
The relationship between the supervision financial governance and the 
characteristics of the banking and financial markets, mentioned above might “hide” 
the importance of other variables such as the legal tradition (legal factor: CommonL), which 
is a determinant in explaining the characteristics of the financing structure.34 The law 
and finance literature stated the existence of a strong relationship between market-oriented 
financial systems and common law jurisdictions. 
It has been claimed that the English law rules are a better support for the individual 
private operations, while French and German code are consistent with more State 
dominance.35 Therefore in a common law country, the supervision would likely be 
characterized by a private funding model. Besides, the dynamic law and finance view 
emphasizes that legal traditions differ in terms of their abilities to adapt to changing 
environments, and that the common law is more dynamic.36 If we share the view that “market 
oriented economies” and “private oriented regimes” are interchangeable concepts, we have 
one more reason to say that the expected sign of the relationship between the level of public 
funding and the common law variable is negative. 
Furthermore, the policymakers´ choice of financing rule may depend on the size of 
their respective economies (economic size factor: Gdp). More specifically, the greater the 
size of the economy, and then, ceteris paribus, the possibility to give to the markets a larger 
role, the more likely seems to be the private funding rule. Following the same line of 
reasoning, the choice of the supervisory funding could depend on the level of economic 
development (economic development factor: Oecd). The expected sign of the relationship 
                                                                          
33. In general, considering the risk of state capture by private vested interests challenges the completeness of the 
traditional indicators of good governance; on this point see Kaufmann (2003). 
34. For example, in Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003) regulation become insignificant in explaining banking 
performance when checking for institutional indicators. 
35. For a survey see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
36. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
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between the level of public funding and the size of the economy —or the level of economic 
development— is negative. 
The geographical factor (Europe) might be important in explaining the supervisors’ 
financing rule. Europe has witnessed important reforms of the national financial architectures 
over the past decade. In general, the recent literature emphasizes the role of geography in 
shaping institutions.37 In the equation, we test whether the policymaker’s choices of financing 
rule depend on whether the country is located in Europe.38 The expected sign of the 
relationship between the financing rule and the geographical factor is undetermined (i. e. can 
be either positive or negative). 
Finally, the policymaker may choose the financing rule in response to the structure of 
the financial system. The recent literature on financial structure presents two opposite 
financial models: the equity model (or market-based structure) and the bank model 
(or bank-based structure). Therefore, the control variables must capture whether the financial 
structure (financial factor: MvB Index and Mcap) matters in defining the policymaker’s 
choice of financing rules. 
It could be argued that a market based structure would be more oriented toward 
private funding. In both structures, the policymaker can be motivated to establish a public 
funding regime in order to increase the probability of being the veto player. But in the bank 
based structure politicians have fewer incentives to promote a private funding regime 
structure in order to reduce the likelihood of capture by supervised firms. Therefore, one 
would expect more public financing in countries with a bank based structure. The expected 
sign of the relationship between the supervisor's public funding rule and the market base 
structure is negative. 
Given the nature of the banking and financial industry, other features can influence 
the politicians. 
First of all, we can claim that the degree of concentration in banking industry could 
be a variable influencing the financing rule in banking supervision. If the financial structure is 
more concentrated the regulatory capture can be more likely and therefore the politicians will 
prefer a public financed supervision. The expected sign of the relationship between the public 
funding and the degree of concentration of the banking system (Conc) is positive. 
Secondly, we can argue that the degree of internationalisation of the banking 
industry could be a relevant variable. The openness of the banking system could incentive the 
policymakers to avoid the private funding of supervision, to avoid that foreign banks can 
capture the supervisor. The expected sign of the relationship between the public funding and 
the degree of internationalisation of the banking system (Intern) is positive. 
The general specification is represented by equation (1): 
 
                                                                          
37. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). 
38. Masciandaro (2005 and 2006) tested a legal neighbour effect in explaining  the overall supervision architectures, with 
different country sample. 
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where subscripts 901K=i  index the financial authorities of the sample presented in Table1. 
The variables are the following: 
 
SBR is the index of the supervisory financing rule, with the public funding regime = 2, 
the mix funding = 1 and the private funding regime = 0. 
Anature CB is a binary variable for the agency nature (institutional factor). It is a 
dummy that expresses the nature of the supervisory agency, central bank (1) versus single 
financial authority (0). 
Year of the agency establishment (variable for the agency age). 
MvB Index binary variable for the financial factor. It is a dummy that represents the 
financial system of a given country, market-based (1) versus bank-based  (0).39 
Mcap quantitative variable for the financial factor. It is the ratio of the securities 
market size (capitalization) relative to GDP of each country.40 
Goodgov quantitative variable for the public governance factor. It shows the 
structural capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound and market friendly 
policies.41 
Gdp quantitative variable for the economic size factor (Gross Domestic Product ).42 
Oecd binary variable for the economic growth factor. It is a dummy that signals 
whether a given country is OECD member (1) or not (0). 
                                                                          
39. The index is calculated using different banking and financial variables: see Demigüç-Kunt and Levine (1999). 
For each variables we calculate the mean of four time values: 1996,1998, 2000, 2002. 
40. World Bank, 2003, World Development Indicators, Stock Markets 5.3. For each variable we calculate the mean of 
four time values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002. Note that the correlation index between the financial regime variable (MvB) 
and the market capitalization variable (mcap) is high (0.50), but their specific influence on the dependent variable is 
relatively low (0.22 and 0.29 respectively); see Table 8. 
41. The index is built using all the indicators proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2003). They define (public) governance as 
the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good, thus 
encompassing: 1) the process of selecting, monitoring and replacing governments; 2) the capacity to formulate and 
implement sound policies and deliver public services; 3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them. Furthermore, for measurement and analysis purposes, these 
three dimensions of governance can be further unbundled to comprise two measurable concepts per each of the 
dimensions above for a total of six components: 1) voice and external accountability; 2) political stability and 
lack of violence; 3) government effectiveness; 4) lack of regulatory burden; 5) rule of law; 6) control of corruption. 
The authors present a set of estimates of these six dimensions of governance for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002. For every country, therefore, we first calculate the mean of the four time values for each dimension of governance; 
then we build up an index of global good governance in the period 1996-2002, calculating the mean of the six different 
dimensions. 
42. World Bank, 2003, World Development Indicators. For each variable we calculate the mean of four time values: 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002. Note that the correlation index between the economic size variable (Gdp) and the economic 
growth (Oecd) is not so high (0.37), and their specific influence on the dependent variable is opposite (0.05 and -0.37 
respectively); see Table 8. 
 
tInternConcCommonLβ
EuropeβOecdgdpβgoodgovβmcapβ
MvBβYearβAnatureCBβSBR
εββ
β
+++
++++++
++=
)()()(
)()()( )()(
)()()()(
11109
8765i4
i3i21i
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0725 
Europe binary variable for the geographical factor. It is a dummy that signals 
whether a given country is European (1) or not (0). 
CommonL binary variable for the law factor. It is a dummy that indicates that 
Common Law is the legal root (1) or not (0) of each country, representing the control variables 
for the law and finance view.43 
Conc a quantitative continuous variable. It measures the degree of concentration of 
the banking industry.44 
Intern a quantitative continuous variable. It measures the degree of 
internationalisation of the banking system.45 
Tables 2 and 3 show the Logit and Probit estimates of Equation (2), without 
considering the concentration effect and the internationalisation effect. In the multinomial 
ordered models, the impact of a change in an explanatory variable on the estimated 
probabilities of the highest and lowest of the order classifications—in our case the public 
funding model and the private funding model— is unequivocal: If βj is positive, for example, an 
increase in the value of xj increases the probability of having the public funding model, while it 
decreases the probability of having the private model. 
The results of the estimates confirm the robustness of the role of agency nature in 
explaining the financing rule. The probability of a public funding rule is always directly and 
significantly related to the central banks’ presence as banking supervisor. If the banking 
supervisor is the central bank, the seignorage tradition is dominant, and therefore the 
probability of public funding is higher. 
Secondly, we find a significant role of the financial structure of a country, measured 
by whether it is predominantly market or bank oriented. In the latter case, public funding 
seems more likely. A possible interpretation is that in a bank oriented financial system 
policymakers wish to have a firmer grip on the supervisor and/or prefer to reduce the risk of 
supervisory capture by banks. 
Finally, we find that the probability that a financing rule follows a public finance model 
is lower in European countries, confirming that the recent wave of supervisory reforms in 
Europe increased the likelihood of private funding. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the Logit and Probit estimates of Equation (2) considering both 
the concentration effect and the internationalisation effect. Given the data availability the 
country sample is smaller. 
                                                                          
43. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
44. The variable is constructed as the percentage of total deposits hold by the five major banks of the country at the 
end of 2001. The variable is derived as answer to the question 2.6.2 from the new database about bank regulation and 
supervision constructed by Caprio-Levine (2003). The dataset is based on a survey sent to national bank regulatory 
and supervisory authorities of 107 countries. It is organised in 12 parts with 175 question s covering different aspect of 
financial supervision like: entry into banking; ownership; capital; activities; external auditing requirements; internal 
management/organizational requirement; liquidity and diversification requirements; depositor protection schemes; 
provisioning requirements; accounting/information disclosure requirements; discipline/problem institutions/exit and 
supervision. 
45. The variable is constructed as the percentage of  banking sector’s assets hold 50% or more by foreign institutions 
or firms at the end of 2001. The variable is derived from the database contained in Caprio-Levine (2003) and 
corresponds to the question 3.8.2 (for a description of the database, see footnote 14). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0725 
It is interesting to compare the magnitude of the different effect using both Table 2 
and Table4. The results contained in Table 4 confirm the robustness of the role of agency 
nature in explaining the budgetary governance regime. The coefficient related to the nature of 
the supervisory agency is positive and highly significant: where the supervisory authority 
is represented by the Central Bank, the probability to have a public funding rule is higher with 
respect to regimes with a different financial supervisory authority. 
All other variable significantly influencing the type of financing rule in supervision 
keep being significant: the financial structure of a country continues to have a significant 
role with public funding positively correlated with a more bank oriented system. The variable 
representing European countries is still significant and shows that public funding model is 
progressively being sunbstituted by a more private funding scheme. 
There are two factors that can be underline when comparing the results with and 
without variables indicating the degree of concentration and of internationalisation of the 
banking industry. All the significant effects become more robust, both in the case of the logit 
than of the probit model. However, only the effect of concentration in banking sector on the 
financing rules is found to be weakly significant, but with the wrong sign. 
In addition, we test the hypothesis that the policymaker decides between two 
extreme financial rules of supervision: full public funding or not. The dependent variable 
(PUF)46 is a binary variable to be estimated with Logit and Probit models, according to the 
following probability model: 
 
 
Tables 2,3,4 and 5 show the Logit and Probit estimates. The results confirm the 
robustness of the effect of the institutional, financial and geographical factors. 
 
                                                                          
46. We use the binary index PUF according to the following scale: 1 = Public funding ; 0 = Otherwise (Private Funding 
and Mix Funding). 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the financial governance of banking supervision in a sample of 
90 countries worldwide. The empirical analysis focuses on the financing rules and attempts 
to identify factors that explain the differences between supervisory authorities. 
From the methodological point of view, the fact that no theoretical optimal financing 
model has been developed may lead to two different views. It could be argued that society 
believes that financing rules do not matter and that these rules are chosen or have developed 
randomly. The alternative is that the financing model of supervision depends on country 
specific circumstances. 
This paper makes an initial attempt to verify whether the empirical evidence 
favours the second view. Our findings show that the financing rule of banking supervision is 
related to the type of supervisory authority: if the supervisor is a central bank, public funding 
is more likely. Furthermore, the country’s financial structure seems to be a significant factor. 
We find that private financing by supervised entities is more likely in countries that have 
market as compared to bank structures. Third, European banking supervisors are more 
likely to be privately funded as compared to supervisors in other countries. This may be a 
response to developments in the financial sector in European countries, it may be related to 
the development towards the European Monetary Union, and it may be a result of peer group 
pressure. 
Future research on the subject should consider additional factors that may affect 
the financing structure of banking supervision. Potential candidates are the degree of 
concentration, conglomeration and internationalisation of the financial system. Of course, 
there may be a correlation between these additional potentially explanatory variables 
and the measure of market versus bank orientation of the financial system structure. The 
history of both the institutional development of supervision and that of financial stability may 
also play a role. For example, in those instances in which insurance supervision was 
traditionally developed and therefore financed by the supervised firms, it is more likely that a 
conglomerated financial sector will have at least some private funding of supervision. 
Moreover, it could be that countries with a largely internationalized financial sector are more 
subject to peer group pressure to choose a particular type of financing rule of supervision. 
Finally, large scale financial scandals may have affected the monitoring of supervisory 
activities by the government, including budgetary monitoring and the financing rule. In this 
context, the study of the relation between the financing rules and the accountability 
arrangements seems the natural follow-up of this paper. 
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7. Tables and Figures 
 
 Table 1  Supervisory Authorities in 90 countries 
Source: Masciandaro 2005 
 
 Countries Banking 
Sector (b) 
Securities 
Sector (s) 
Insurance 
Sector (i) 
1 Albania CB S I 
2 Argentina CB S I 
3 Australia BI,S BI,S BI,S 
4 Austria U U U 
5 Bahamas CB S I 
6 Belarus CB S I  
7 Belgium U U U 
8 Bolivia B SI SI 
9 Bosnia CB,B1,B2 S I 
10 Botswana  CB S I 
11 Brazil CB S CB,I 
12 Bulgaria CB S I  
13 Cameroon  CB S I 
14 Canada BI Ss(**) BI 
15 Chile B SI SI  
16 China B S I 
17 Colombia BI S BI 
18 Costa Rica B S I 
19 Croatia CB S I 
20 Cyprus CB S I 
21 Czech Republic CB  S I 
22 Denmark U U U 
23 Ecuador BI S BI 
24 Egypt CB S I 
25 El Salvador BI S BI 
26 Estonia U U U 
27 Finland BS BS I 
28 France BC,B1,B2,B3 CB,S I 
29 Georgia CB S I 
30 Germany U U U 
31 Greece CB S I 
32 Guatemala BI S BI 
33 Hong Kong CB S I 
34 Hungary U U U 
35 Iceland U U U  
36 India CB,B S I 
37 Iran CB CB I 
38 Ireland CB CB CB 
39 Israel CB S,I I 
40 Italy CB,S CB,S I 
41 Jamaica CB SI SI 
42 Japan U U U 
43 Jordan CB S I 
44 Kazakhstan U U U 
45 Kenya CB S1, S2 I 
46 Korea U U U 
47 Latvia U U U 
48 Lebanon  CB,B CB I 
49 Libya CB SI SI 
50 Lithuania CB S I 
51 Luxembourg BS BS I 
52 Macedonia CB S - 
53 Malaysia CB S CB 
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54 Malta U U U 
62 Norway U U U 
63 Pakistan CB SI SI 
64 Panama B S I 
65 Peru BI S BI 
66 Philippines CB CB,S I 
67 Poland CB BC,S I1,I2 
68 Portugal CB CB,S I 
69 Romania CB S I 
70 Russia CB S I 
71 Saudi Arabia CB CB CB 
72 Slovak Republic CB SI SI 
73 Slovenia CB S I 
74 South Africa CB SI  SI  
75 Spain CB CB,S I 
76 Sri Lanka CB S I 
77 Sweden U U U 
78 Switzerland BS BS I 
79 Thailand CB S I 
80 Trinidad Tobago CB S I 
81 Tunisia CB S I 
82 Turkey B S I 
83 Ukraine CB S - 
84 UAE CB S I 
85 UK U U U 
86 USA CB,B S,Ss** I,Is(**) 
87 Uruguay BS, CB BS, BC I, BC 
88 Venezuela B S I 
89 Vietnam  CB S I 
90 Zimbabwe CB S I 
 
 
The initials have the following meaning: B = authority specialized in the banking sector; BI = authority 
specialized in the banking sector and insurance sector;  CB = central bank;  G= government;  I = authority 
specialized in the insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the securities markets; U = single authority for 
all sectors ; BS = authority specialized in the banking sector and securities markets;;  SI = authority specialized 
in the insurance sector and securities markets. 
 
 (**) = state or regional agencies. 
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Figure 1 
Financing Supervision: 53 Central Banks 
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Figure2 
Financing Supervision: 37 (S)Fas 
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    Table 2  Logit Estimates 
 
VARIABLES OLogit Logit 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SBR PUF 
 
Agency Nature CB 
Coefficient β1 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
5.23 
1.12 
  0.00 *** 
 
 
5.37 
1.41 
0.00 *** 
 
Year - Agency 
Establishment  
Coefficient β2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.006 
0.007 
0.35 
 
 
-0.009 
0.008 
0.27 
 
MvB 
Coefficient β3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-2.21 
1.07 
0.04 ** 
 
 
-3.25 
1.42 
0.02 ** 
 
Mcap 
Coefficient β4 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-1.70 
1.05 
0.11 
 
 
-0.92 
1.14 
0.42 
 
Goodgov 
Coefficient β5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.024 
0.837 
0.97 
 
 
-0.32 
0.92 
0.72 
 
Gdp 
Coefficient β6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.001 
0.0008 
0.11 
 
 
0.001 
0.001 
0.11 
Oecd 
Coefficient β7 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.24 
1.31 
0.85 
 
-1.05 
1.65 
0.52 
Europe 
Coefficient β8 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-2.86 
1.08 
0.00 *** 
 
-2.34 
1.33 
0.07 * 
Common Law 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
-0.148 
1.216 
0.90 
 
 
0.07 
1.43 
0.95 
 
Constant 
Coefficient  
Std. Error 
P >z 
  
18.22 
16.97 
0.28 
No of observations 90 90 
LR chi2(9)(8) 84.05 72.13 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.59 
Log Likelihood -39.05 -24.07 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent; ** indicates statistical significance at 5  percent; 
* indicates statistical significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 3 Probit Estimates 
 
 VARIABLES OProbit Probit 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SBR PUF 
  
Agency Nature CB 
Coefficient β1 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
2.99 
0.59 
0.00 *** 
 
 
3.06 
0.76 
0.00 *** 
  
Year - Agency 
Establishment 
Coefficient β2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.004 
0.004 
0.25 
 
 
- 0.005 
0.005 
0.27 
 
  
MvB 
Coefficient β3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-1.39 
0.59 
0.02  ** 
 
 
-1.88 
0.80 
0.01 *** 
  
mcap 
Coefficient β4 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.89 
0.59 
0.13 
 
 
-0.52 
0.66 
0.42 
  
goodgov 
Coefficient β5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.14 
0.44 
0.73 
 
 
-0.26 
0.49 
0.59 
 Oecd 
Coefficient β7 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
0.31 
0.71 
0.66 
 
-0.46 
0.88 
0.59 
 
 Gdp 
Coefficient β6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
0.0006 
0.0004 
0.18 
 
0.001 
0.0007 
0.13 
 Europe 
Coefficient β8 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
-1.65 
0.60 
0.00 ***  
 
-1.35 
0.72 
0.06 * 
 
 Common Law 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
-0.01 
0.65 
0.97 
 
0.12 
0.78 
0.87 
 Constant  
Coefficient  
Std. Error 
P >z 
  
10.76 
10.03 
0.28 
 No of observations 89 (+) 90 
 LR chi2(8) 84.17 72.93 
 Prob>chi2 0.00 0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.52 0.60 
 Log Likelihood -38.50 -23.67 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent; ** indicates statistical significance at 5  percent;
* indicates statistical significance at 10 percent; (+) one observation dropped. 
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Table 4 Logit Estimates with  Concentration Effect  and Internationalisation Effect 
 
VARIABLES OLogit Logit 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SBR PUF 
Agency Nature CB 
Coefficient β1 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
6.12 
1.40 
  0.00 *** 
 
 
8.26 
2.81 
0.00 *** 
Year - Agency 
Establishment 
Coefficient β2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.015 
0.01 
0.14 
 
 
-0.01 
0.013 
0.16 
MvB 
Coefficient β3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-3.26 
1.27 
0.01 *** 
 
 
-5.81 
2.55 
0.02 ** 
Mcap 
Coefficient β4 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-1.55 
1.58 
0.32 
 
 
-1.18 
2.50 
0.63 
Goodgov 
Coefficient β5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.15 
0.99 
0.87 
 
 
0.31 
1.21 
0.79  
Oecd 
Coefficient β7 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
1.84 
1.51 
0.22 
 
1.93 
1.86 
0.29 
Europe 
Coefficient β8 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-3.69 
1.46 
0.01 *** 
 
-5.97 
2.83 
0.03 ** 
Common Law 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
2.10 
0.023 
0.18 
 
 
3.73 
3.00 
0.21  
 
Conc 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
-0.04 
0.023 
0.092 * 
 
 
-0.04 
0.02 
0.15  
 
Intern 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
0.11 
0.016 
0.48 
 
 
0.19 
0.02 
0.42  
 
Constant 
Coefficient  
Std. Error 
P >z 
  
24.98 
17.62 
0.15 
No of observations 76 76 
LR chi2(9)(8) 74.49 69.97 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.53 0.68 
Log Likelihood -31.83 -16.39 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent; ** indicates statistical significance at 5  percent; 
* indicates statistical significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 5 Probit Estimates with Concentration Effect and Internationalisation Effect 
 
 VARIABLES OProbit Probit 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SBR PUF 
 Agency Nature CB 
Coefficient β1 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
3.57 
0.77 
0.00 *** 
 
 
4.61 
1.50 
0.00 *** 
 Year - Agency 
Establishment 
Coefficient β2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.00 
0.006 
0.13 
 
 
- 0.009 
0.007 
0.20 
 
 MvB 
Coefficient β3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-1.89 
0.72 
0.00 *** 
 
 
-3.21 
1.40 
0.02 ** 
 mcap 
Coefficient β4 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.82 
0.88 
0.35 
 
 
-0.62 
1.33 
0.64 
 goodgov 
Coefficient β5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.02 
0.52 
0.96 
 
 
0.12 
0.66 
0.85 
 Oecd 
Coefficient β7 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
1.08 
0.82 
0.18  
 
1.09 
1.06 
0.30 
 
 Europe 
Coefficient β8 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
-2.18 
0.82 
0.00***   
 
-3.22 
1.53 
0.03 ** 
 
 Common Law 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
1.18 
0.92 
0.20 
 
2.04 
1.55 
0.18 
 Conc 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
-0.022 
0.013 
0.087 *  
 
-0.02 
0.01 
0.15 
 Intern 
Coefficient β9 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
0.00 
0.009 
0.47 
 
0.00 
0.01 
0.46 
 Constant 
Coefficient  
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
19.50 
14.93 
0.19 
 No of observations 76 76 
 LR chi2(8) 75.65 70.29 
 Prob>chi2 0.00 0.000 
 Pseudo R2 0.54 0.68 
 Log Likelihood -41.77 -16.23 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent; ** indicates statistical significance at 5  percent; 
* indicates statistical significance at 10 percent. 
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